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GOVERNANCE OF OUR SECURITIES MARKETS
AND THE FAILURE TO ALLOCATE
REGULATORY RESPONSIBILITY
David A. Lipton*
The market regulatory structure of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act'
(1934 Act or Act) was conceived in response to the documented inability of
the securities industry to maintain fair and honest trading markets.2 The
innovative oversight system created by the Act, as amended, is perceived as
a model of authority sharing by government and industry in the regulation
of a vital enterprise affected with the public interest.3
* Associate Professor of Law, Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law. B.A. 1966, Cornell University; M.A. 1968, Columbia University; J.D. 1972, Michigan
University.
1. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1982)) [hereinafter cited as the 1934 Act or the Act].
2. The Supreme Court described Congress' motivation in adopting the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 as a response to "the combination of the enormous growth in the power
and impact of exchanges in our economy, and their inability and unwillingness to curb
abuses." Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341, 351-52 (1963). For accounts of the trading abuses that
existed prior to the 1934 legislation, see Stock Exchange Practices, Hearings Before the Senate
Banking Committee, 72nd and 73rd Cong. (1932-34) (frequently referred to as the Pecora
hearings, in reference to the notable counsel of the Committee, Ferdinand Pecora); R.
DEBEDTS, THE NEW DEAL'S SEC, chs. 1-3 (1964); F. PECORA, WALL STREET UNDER OATH
(1939); J. SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET (1982); TWENTIETH CEN-
TURY FUND, THE SECURITY MARKETS 443-508 (1934); Tracy & MacChesney, The Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 32 MICH. L. REV. 1025, 1027-33 (1934).
3. In 1934, the Act was described as "a tremendous experiment in governmental regula-
tion of business." Tracy & MacChesney, supra note 2, at 1037. Nearly 30 years later, the
Securities and Exchange Commission in enumerating the virtues of the self-regulatory mecha-
nism, which it had administered since 1934, found the self-regulatory scheme attractive
because
the expertness and immediacy of self-regulation often provide the most expedient
and practical means for regulation. By making those regulated actual participants in
the regulatory process they become more aware of the goals of regulation and their
own stake in it. In some areas the self-regulatory bodies can promote adherence to
ethical standards beyond those which could be established as a matter of law.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES
MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 4 at 722 (1963) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL STUDY].
That the exchanges were perceived as being affected with the public interest was evident in
the 1934 report of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce that noted that
"[tihe great exchanges of this country upon which millions of dollars of securities are sold are
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A curious feature of this cooperative regulatory system is that the author-
ity of government and of industry to respond to specific market regulatory
concerns frequently overlap. In many instances, both the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC or Commission) and the self-regulatory organiza-
tions (SROs), that is, the major security exchanges4 and the National
Association of Securities Dealers (the NASD),5 are statutorily authorized to
initiate regulatory problem solving. Furthermore, in most instances of joint
authority, the securities acts do not provide guidance as to which of the two
parties should assume primary regulatory responsibility.
This dual authority system, while attractive as a demonstration of indus-
try and government cooperation in a common regulatory endeavor, suffers
from a number of existing and potential problems that result primarily from
the lack of statutory guidance provided for allocating authority. Because of
the dual nature of the regulatory system and its concomitant lack of explicit
authority allocating principles, regulatory inaction is encouraged by the un-
certainty that the system engenders as to whether government or industry
ultimately will be allocated responsibility for specific problems. In other in-
stances, responsibility is assumed by the regulatory body that is least likely
to deal effectively with a specific regulatory concern. Finally, the system
discourages industry diligence in the performance of its own self-regulatory
obligations. This discouragement results from potential industry recognition
that, without clearly assigned regulatory responsibilities, problems ignored
by industry regulators will eventually have to be responded to by the Com-
mission, which retains ultimate responsibility for market regulation.
I. ORIGINS OF OVERLAPPING AUTHORITY
As initially envisioned, the government was to assume primarily a stand-
by role in the regulation of the securities markets.6 The government was
affected with a public interest in the same degree as any other great utility." H.R. REP. No.
1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1934).
4. The major security exchanges include the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the
American Stock Exchange (AMEX), the Midwest Stock Exchange (MSE), the Pacific Stock
Exchange (PSE), the Philadelphia Stock Exchange (PHLYX), and the Cincinnati Stock Ex-
change (CSE).
5. The NASD was established primarily to govern trading in the over-the-counter
(nonexchange) markets. Its authority arises under § 15A of the 1934 Act, supra note 1. In
1938, § 15A was added to the 1934 Act by the Maloney Over-the-Counter Market Act, Pub.
L. No. 75-719, 52 Stat. 1070 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o, 78o-3, 78cc,
78ff, 78q (1982)) [hereinafter cited as the Maloney Act].
6. The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, which was responsible
for working on the bill that ultimately became the 1934 Act, stated:
[R]eserved control is in the Commission if the exchanges do not meet their respon-
sibility. It is hoped that the effect of the bill will be to give to the well-managed
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expected to oversee the activities of the self-regulators and to step in and
regulate market trading only when the self-regulatory bodies proved incapa-
ble of regulating, or unwilling to regulate, themselves. During the House
hearings on the bill that was to become the 1934 Act, Congressman Charles
A. Wolverton explained the government's contribution to self-regulation
under the proposed act as follows: "[T]he exchange should be permitted or
required to regulate themselves; but there should be Federal authority hold-
ing the power . . . referred to as 'a big stick.' ,7
Yet, even pursuant to this somewhat limited role initially afforded the
government, there were frequent instances in which the authority of the SEC
and that of the exchanges overlapped. For example, the originally enacted
section 6(b) of the 1934 Act required that before an exchange could be regis-
tered with the SEC, the exchange must have in place rules for disciplining
members for conduct "inconsistent with just and equitable principles of
trade."8 But this same misconduct that the exchanges were required to dis-
cipline could also trigger Commission injunctive action pursuant to the orig-
inally enacted section 21(e) that empowered the Commission to bring an
action to enjoin any violation or potential violation of the 1934 Act.9
Instances of overlapping authority between the SEC and the self-regula-
tory bodies have markedly increased in the past two decades as the Commis-
sion's market regulatory role has expanded as a result of Commission
practice and congressional legislation. In the mid-1960's, the Commission,
exchanges that power necessary to enable them to effect themselves needed reforms
and that the occasion for direct action by the Commission will not arise.
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1934).
7. Stock Exchange Regulation, Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 544 (1934) [hereinafter cited
as 1934 House Hearings].
8. 1934 Act, supra note 1, § 6(b), at 886 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1982)).
Today, a similar requirement for registration exists. Pursuant to the present § 6(b), exchanges
may not be registered unless the rules of the exchange provide for appropriate discipline for
violation of the rules of the exchange. The exchange rules in turn must be "designed to pre-
vent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and equitable principles
of trade . . . and, in general, to protect investors and the public interest." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78f(b)(5) (1982).
9. 1934 Act, supra note I, § 21(e), at 900 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)
(1982)). The Commission's specific disciplinary authority over brokers was initially limited to
a broad mandate to prescribe regulations to register brokers of over-the-counter securities. Id.
§ 15, at 895 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78(o) (1982)). In 1936, this authority was
refined to state clearly that the Commission could revoke the registration of brokers who will-
fully violated, among other statutes, the Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1982)), or the 1934 Act, supra note 1, or rules thereun-
der. Consequently, a broker who, for example, manipulated the market in violation of
§ 9(a)(2) of the 1934 Act could be disciplined by the Commission under §§ 21(e) or 15(b)(4)(d)
of the 1934 Act or by the exchanges pursuant to their own rules.
1985]
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motivated by the recommendations found in its seminal Report of the Spe-
cial Study of the Securities Market, began more actively to assert its existing
authority to correct trading abuses in the securities markets.'° As an exam-
ple, in 1964 the Commission adopted rule l la-1 restricting the activity of
floor traders." Floor traders are brokers who trade for themselves while on
the floor of an exchange thus experiencing certain competitive advantages
over public investors resulting from being in the right place at the right time.
Although the Commission had studied floor trading on several occasions
since its inception and had concluded that it should be curtailed, the Com-
mission had, by and large, left the resolution of how to deal with floor trad-
ing primarily to exchange rulemaking.' 2 It was not until nearly thirty years
after completing its first study on floor trading that the Commission was
sufficiently self-confident to assume responsibility for this activity by
promulgating rule I1 a-1.' 3 The restrictions adopted by the SEC were later
incorporated into amendments made to the Securities Exchange Act.14
10. Professor Richard W. Jennings describes this more aggressive use by the Commission
of its then existing authority in Jennings, Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry: The Role
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 663, 665-67 (1964).
This more assertive Commission behavior, particularly in the area of discipline, was champi-
oned by the then Chairman of the Commission, Professor William L. Cary, who stated:
In sum, I do not agree that the Commission should have to resign itself to a vestig-
ial role in dealing with an exchange and its members. I feel we [the Commission]
must become directly involved, as we have in major disciplinary proceedings involv-
ing exchange members, where important questions of principle are at stake.
Cary, Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry, 49 A.B.A. J. 244, 246 (1963).
II. Rule lla-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.1la-1 (1984), was adopted in SEA Release No. 7330
(Aug. 3, 1964).
12. As an example of how the Commission had failed to act on its own judgment regard-
ing floor trading, the SPECIAL STUDY reported that: "In 1945 the Commission proposed the
abolition of floor trading, but withheld action in light of repeated assurances that the ex-
changes would develop effective self-regulation of this activity." Id. pt. 2, at 241. Implicit in
this account of the Commission's nonregulation of floor trading is the recognition that both the
Commission and the exchanges had the authority to regulate floor trading.
Charts and tables from some of these Commission studies are reproduced in the SPECIAL
STUDY. See SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 3, pt. 2, app. H, at 497-524.
13. Rule I la-I prohibits exchange members, while on the floor of such exchange, from
initiating "directly or indirectly, any transaction in any security admitted to trading on such
exchange, for any account in which such member has an interest, or for any such account with
respect to which such member has [certain specified] discretion." 17 C.F.R. § 240.1 la-l(a)
(1984).
14. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 6(2), 89 Stat. 97, 110
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78k(a)(1) (1982)) [hereinafter cited as the Securities
Amendments Act]. Section 6(2) of the Securities Amendments Act amends § I 1 of the 1934
Act by adding subsection (a)(l). This provision makes it unlawful for any member of a na-
tional securities exchange to "effect any transaction on such exchange for its own account, the
account of an associated person, or an account with respect to which it or an associated person
thereof exercises investment discretion." Eight exceptions to the general proscription are pro-
[Vol. 34:397
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Of greater impact on the growth of the Commission's power (than the
aggressive use of its existing authority) is the expansion of the Commission's
market regulatory role mandated by Congress through amendments to the
Securities Exchange Act. The most significant of these amendments is the
Securities Reform Act of 1975 (Reform Act)."5 The Reform Act provides
the Commission with authority to add to and otherwise change the rules of
the SROs,' 6 to enforce these rules,' 7 to discipline SROs and their officers,"8
and to foster market structure developments.' 9
As a result of this expansion of power, the Commission now has the au-
thority to amend exchange and NASD rules in any respect and regarding
any subject matter, provided the change is consistent with the purposes of
the Act.2" The pre-1975 Act required the Commission to first request an
vided for transactions arising from (i) market making, (ii) odd-lot trading, (iii) stabilization,
(iv) arbitrage, (v) trading for the account of a natural person, (vi) offsetting errors, (vii) a
securities business that is primarily not floor trading, and (viii) other activities that the Com-
mission deems should be exempt from the § 11(a) proscriptions.
15. Securities Amendments Act, supra note 14.
16. Securities Amendments Act, supra note 14, § 16, at 150 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78s(c) (1982)) (amends § 19(c) of the 1934 Act and authorizes the Commission to
"abrogate, add to and delete from" the rules of an SRO).
17. See Securities Amendments Act, supra note 14, § 17(2), at 154 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1982)) (amends § 21(e) of the 1934 Act and authorizes the Commission
to bring actions to enjoin violations of, among other prohibitions, exchange rules); Securities
Amendments Act, supra note 14, § 16, at 152 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h)(1)
(1982)) (amends § 19 of the 1934 Act by adding subsection (h)(1) which authorizes the Com-
mission to discipline an SRO for, among other matters, failure to obtain compliance by its own
members of its rules); Securities Amendments Act, supra note 14, § 16, at 153-54 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h)(4) (1982)) (amends § 19 of the 1934 Act by adding subsection
(h)(4) which authorizes the Commission to discipline SRO officers or directors for, among
other matters, failure to obtain compliance by SRO members of SRO rules).
18. See Securities Amendments Act, supra note 14, § 16, at 152 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 78s(h)(1) (1982)) (amends § 19 of the 1934 Act by adding subsection (h)(1) which
authorizes the Commission to discipline SROs); Securities Amendments Act, supra note 14,
§ 16, at 153-54 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h)(4) (1982)) (amends § 19 of the 1934
Act by adding subsection (h)(4) which authorizes the Commission to discipline SRO officers
and directors).
19. See Securities Amendments Act, supra note 14, § 7, at 112 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(2) (1982)) (amends § 11 of the 1934 Act by adding § 1lA(a)(2) which di-
rects the Commission to use its authority to "facilitate the establishment of a national market
system").
20. See Securities Amendments Act, supra note 14, § 16, at 150 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (1982)). This section amends § 19(c) of the 1934 Act by authorizing the
Commission to
abrogate, add to, and delete from . . . the rules of a self-regulatory organization
• . . as the Commission deems necessary or appropriate to insure the fair administra-
tion of the self-regulatory organization, to conform its rules to requirements of [the
Act] and the rules and regulations thereunder applicable to such organization, or
otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of this [Act] . . ..
19851
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exchange to make a specified alteration itself before the Commission could
adopt the amendment. Additionally, the Commission's amendments were
limited to certain subject matters.2 1 Furthermore, since 1975, the SEC has
had the authority actually to enforce the SROs' own rules by investigating
violations of these rules and by bringing actions to enjoin such violations.2 2
The Reform Act also grants the Commission, for the first time, a variety
of disciplinary powers over the self-regulatory organizations.2 3 In addition,
21. Under the original 1934 Act, supra note 1, § 19(b), at 898-99 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1982)), the Commission was authorized to "alter or supplement" exchange
rules only in respect to twelve specified matters and only after written request was made and
appropriate notice and opportunity for hearing were given. The Commission's pre-1975 SRO
rule amending authority was broader vis-a-vis the NASD than the exchanges. Under
§ 15A(k)(1) of the 1934 Act, securities association rules could be abrogated by the Commis-
sion without any requirement of a request for action being made upon the association and
without limitation as to subject matter of the rule. See Maloney Act, supra note 5, § 1, at 1974
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(k)(1) (1982)).
22. Securities Amendments Act, supra note 14, § 17, at 154 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1982)). This section amends § 21(a) of the 1934 Act and empowers the Com-
mission to conduct investigations to determine if there are current or past violations of either
the rules of an SRO or the Commission's own rules as well as the provisions of the 1934 Act.
See also Securities Amendments Act, supra note 14, § 17, at 154-55 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1982)). This section amends § 21(e) of the 1934 Act and empowers the Com-
mission to bring an action to enjoin violations of an SRO's or the Commission's rules. Prior to
1975, the Commission's authority to investigate and to bring injunctions did not cover viola-
tions of the SRO's own rules. See 1934 Act, supra note 1, §§ 21(a), (e), at 899, 900 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a), (e) (1982)).
23. Securities Amendments Act, supra note 14, § 16, at 152 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78s(h)(1) (1982)). This section amends § 19(h)(1) of the 1934 Act and empowers the
Commission to suspend, revoke the registration of, censure, or impose limitations upon the
activities, functions, and operations of a self-regulatory organization if, after notice and oppor-
tunity for a hearing, it is found that the SRO either (i) is in violation of or is unable to comply
with provisions of the 1934 Act, rules promulgated thereunder, or its own rules, or (ii) has not
enforced compliance with such statutes and rules by its own members. Prior to 1975, the
Commission's options for disciplining exchanges were limited to suspension or withdrawal of
registration and such disciplinary action could not be taken for failure by an exchange to
enforce its own rules. See 1934 Act § 19(a)(1), supra note 1, at 898 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78s(a)(1) (1982)). The Commission's pre-1975 disciplinary authority vis-a-vis the
NASD was broader. Under § 15A()(1) of the 1934 Act, a securities association could be
disciplined for failing to enforce its own rules. See Maloney Act, supra note 5, § 1, at 1074
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1982)).
Further, § 19(h)(4) of the amended 1934 Act now gives the Commission authority to re-
move from office or censure SRO officers or directors if, after notice and opportunity for a
hearing, the Commission finds either (i) willful violation of the 1934 Act or the regulations
thereunder or the SRO rules, or (ii) failure to enforce compliance by members of the SRO
rules. See Securities Amendments Act, supra note 14, § 16, at 153-54 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 78s(h)(4) (1982)). Prior to 1975, the Commission's authority to expel or suspend
exchange officers did not apply to situations involving a failure to enforce the exchange's own
rules. See 1934 Act, supra note 1, § 19(a)(1), (3), at 898 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78(h)(1), (3) (1982)). Again, the Commission's pre-1975 authority to discipline NASD of-
ficers was broader. Under § 15A(0(3) of the 1934 Act, there was Commission authority to so
[Vol. 34:397
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the Commission is granted authority to suspend or expel from exchange
membership any NASD members in instances where a member has been
directly disciplined by the Commission or has committed securities acts
violations.24
Finally, the Commission is given a broad mandate to alter the very struc-
ture of the trading markets. The Reform Act directs the Commission to
facilitate the establishment of a national market system and to use its author-
ity to carry out the objectives of this new system.25 The objectives include
the development of certain physical components for the system such as an
intermarket communication and execution system.26 In addition, the objec-
tives also relate to the achievement of certain advancements in regulatory
procedures that, among other matters, would increase the likelihood of cus-
tomers' orders being executed at the best possible price27 and encourage
discipline securities association officers. See Maloney Act, supra note 5, § 1, at 1075 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1982)).
24. Securities Amendments Act, supra note 14, § 16, at 153 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78s(h)(2) (1982)), amends § 19 of the 1934 Act by adding subsection (h)(2). Section
19(h)(2) empowers the Commission to directly discipline by suspension or expulsion from an
SRO any SRO member (i) disciplined by the Commission under § 15(b)(4) for securities law or
other statutory violations impacting upon the member's integrity, or (ii) found, by the Com-
mission, to have violated the Securities Act after notice and opportunity for a hearing.
Prior to 1975, the bases for suspension or expulsion of an exchange member from an ex-
change by the Commission were limited to violations of the 1934 Act or the rules and regula-
tions promulgated thereunder. See 1934 Act, supra note 1, § 19(a)(3), at 898 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a)(3) (1982)). However, under § 15A(l)(2), securities association
members could be suspended or expelled from their association for both 1934 Act violations
and violations of the Securities Act of 1933. See Maloney Act, supra note 5, § 1, at 1075
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1982)).
25. Securities Amendments Act, supra note 14, § 7, at 112 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(2) (1982)). This section amends the 1934 Act by adding § 11A(a)(2), which
directs the Commission with "due regard for the public interest, the protection of investors,
and the maintenance of fair and orderly markets, to use its authority under [the Act] to facili-
tate the establishment of a national market system for securities." The Commission can facili-
tate the establishment of this market system by making such rules and regulations as are
necessary to implement the provisions of the 1934 Act. See Securities Amendments Act, supra
note 14, § 18, at 155 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(1) (1982)) (amending § 23 of
the 1934 Act by adding subsection (a)(l)). The national market system was intended to allow
all trading interests to interact through various communication and execution facilities in or-
der that each investor would have the opportunity to receive the best execution for his transac-
tion. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, REPORT TO
ACCOMPANY S. 249, S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975
SENATE REPORT].
26. Securities Amendments Act, supra note 14, § 7, at 112 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(1)(D) (1982)) (amending the 1934 Act by adding § 11A(a)(1)(D)).
27. Securities Amendments Act, supra note 14, § 7, at 112 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(C)(iv) (1982)) (amending the 1934 Act by adding § 11A(a)(l)(C)(iv)).
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competition among various trading markets.2"
These statutory additions to the Commission's authority were not accom-
panied by any corresponding withdrawal of authority from the SROs. The
self-regulatory bodies retained the authority with which they were originally
endowed in the 1934 Act in areas of discipline, rulemaking, and market op-
erations. Thus, the authority of the Commission and the self-regulators be-
came, in many respects, coextensive.29
II. THE DUAL REGULATORY SYSTEM
The result of this accretion to Commission power is that today the Com-
mission is no longer merely a reactive body providing government oversight
of exchange and NASD self-regulation. Rather, the regulatory system pro-
vides for government initiated direct regulation in conjunction with industry
initiated self-regulation (albeit with government oversight). It is really a
dual regulatory system with two potential initiators3" of rulemaking and en-
28. Securities Amendments Act, supra note 14, § 7, at 112 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(1)(C)(ii) (1982)) (amending the 1934 Act by adding § 11A(a)(1)(C)(ii)).
29. Thus, for example, both the Commission and the SROs can initiate policy regarding
structure and regulation of the national market system. The SROs can initiate policy through
rule proposals. See Securities Amendments Act, supra note 14, § 16, at 147-48 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(l) (1982)) (amending § 19(b)(1) of the 1934 Act), and rule 19b-
4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-4 (1984). The Commission can initiate national market system policy
through its authority to facilitate the establishment of these systems. See Securities Amend-
ments Act, supra note 14, § 7, at 112 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(2) (1982))
(amending the 1934 Act by adding § 1 1A(a)(2)).
An instance in which the SROs initiated market structure policy was the adoption by the
exchanges of the antitrade-through rules in 1981. See Notice and Order Approving Proposed
Amendment to the Intermarket Trading System Plan, SEA Release No. 17,703 (Apr. 9, 1981),
22 SEC DOCKET (CCH) 707 (Apr. 21, 1981) (approving the rule changes). These antitrade-
through rules made brokers who execute transactions in securities traded on the intermarket
trading system or ITS (an execution device that allows brokers on one exchange to effect ex-
ecutions on another exchange) liable for failure to execute their transaction at the best possible
price. These antitrade-through rules foster the objectives of the national market system, which
seeks to assure the practicability of brokers achieving best execution for their trades. See Se-
curities Amendments Act, supra note 14, § 7, at 112 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78k-
l(a)(1)(C)(iv) (1982)) (amending the 1934 Act by adding § 11A(a)(l)(C)(iv)).
An instance in which the Commission initiated market structure policy was its adoption of
the quote rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.1lAcl-1 (1984), promulgated on January 25, 1978. The quote
rule requires SROs to collect and make available current quotations disseminated at the re-
spective SRO market center. The quote rule fosters the national market system objective of
assuring the availability to brokers of quotation information. See Securities Amendments Act,
supra note 14, § 7, at 112 (codified as amended -it 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(1)(C)(iii) (1982))
(amending the 1934 Act by adding § I lA(a)(1)(C)(iii)). See also infra text accompanying
notes 86-92.
30. As a practical matter, when this article describes the Commission as an "initiator" of
regulatory policy or an "overseer" of such policy, cognizance is made of the fact that indeed it
is typically the staff of the Commission that is initiating particular policy or overseeing policy
[Vol. 34:397
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forcement of regulations. The Senate Report accompanying the bill that was
to become the Securities Reform Act of 1975 described this regulatory sys-
tem as one of "mutual regulatory responsibility.",
31
Admittedly, the government still functions in part in a pure oversight or
reactive capacity. The SEC has responsibility for reviewing most rule
changes proposed for adoption by the SROs.32 It can review disciplinary
action taken by the exchanges and the NASD. 33 The Commission can also
guarantee that the SROs are effectively enforcing their own rules through its
authority to discipline these bodies. 34 Finally, the SEC can oversee struc-
implementation. The staff, however, acts as an agent of the Commission. It reviews problems
and develops solutions that it proposes to the Commission. If the Commission adopts the
specific solution, the implementing order, rule change, or release is issued by the authority of
the Commission. However, the action taken by the Commission frequently mirrors the pro-
posals presented by the staff.
31. 1975 SENATE REPORT, supra note 25, at 23. Instances of overlapping authority of the
SROs and the Commission are not limited to matters solely concerning market regulation.
Both the Commission and the SROs have the authority and exercise the authority to require
issuers that are listed on the exchanges and that are reported in the NASD's transaction disclo-
sure system (NASDAQ) to disclose information about themselves. The SROs' authority to
require disclosure arises from §§ 6(b)(5) and 15(A)(b)(6), which are general antimanipulative
provisions intended to "protect investors and the public interest." Securities Amendments
Act, supra note 14, § 4, at 105 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (1982)); Securities Amend-
ments Act, supra note 14, § 12, at 127-28 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6)
(1982)). The Commission's authority to compel disclosure by these issuers arises from the
1934 Act regulation and reporting provisions. 1934 Act, supra note 1, §§ 12(a), (b), (g), 13(a),
at 892, 894 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(a), (b), (g), 78m(a) (1982)).
32. After notice and opportunity for written comments, the Commission must either ap-
prove proposed rules filed by the SROs or institute proceedings to determine whether the
proposed rules should be disapproved. Securities Amendments Act, supra note 14, § 16, at
147-48 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1) (1982)) (amending § 19 of the 1934 Act
by adding new subsections (b)(1), (b)(2)). The Commission may also summarily approve pro-
posed rules if such action is necessary for the protection of investors, the maintenance of fair
and orderly markets, or the safeguarding of securities or funds. Securities Amendments Act,
supra note 14, § 16, at 148 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(3)(B) (1982)) (amending
§ 19 of the 1934 Act by adding new subsection (b)(3)(B)).
33. An SRO must file notice with the Commission of any final disciplinary sanction it
imposes upon any of its members. Securities Amendments Act, supra note 14, § 16, at 150
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d)(1) (1982)) (amending the 1934 Act by adding
§ 19(d)(1)). The Commission can review such disciplinary sanction either on its own motion
or upon motion of any party aggrieved by such disciplinary sanction. Securities Amendments
Act, supra note 14, § 16, at 150-51 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d)(2)(1982))
(amending the 1934 Act by adding § 19(d)(2)). After notice and opportunity for hearing, if the
Commission finds that an actionable violation has occurred, it may affirm the sanction im-
posed, modify it, or remand the matter to the SRO for further proceedings. If the Commission
does not find an actionable violation, it may set aside the sanction and, if appropriate, remand
the matter to the SRO for further proceedings. Securities Amendments Act, supra note 14,
§ 16, at 151 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78s(e)(l)(A), (B) (1982)) (amending the 1934 Act by
adding §§ 19(d)(1)(A), (B)).
34. See supra notes 23-24.
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tural market changes made by the securities industry through the Commis-
sion's authority to oversee the rulemaking efforts of the self-regulators and
its authority to register the SROs.31 In each of these areas of oversight regu-
lation, however, the Commission now also possesses the authority to initiate
regulatory activity. The Commission can directly alter the rules of the self-
regulators.36 It can discipline exchange and NASD members for violations
of both Commission rules as well as the rules of the members' own organiza-
tions.3 7 It can also order changes in the physical components of trading
markets and the operations of these markets.38
This authority of the Commission to initiate direct regulatory activity is
generally not restricted to instances in which self-regulatory bodies have al-
ready expressed an unwillingness or an inability to regulate.39 Congress has
demonstrated an ability to so restrict the Commission when such limitations
were deemed desirable. The original section 19(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act, which gave the Commission authority to directly amend some
categories of exchange rules, indeed did limit the Commission's ability to
amend these rules. Under the original section 19(b), before amending an
35. See supra note 20. Also, the Commission, after notice and an opportunity for written
comments, must either grant applications for registration by SROs or institute proceedings to
determine whether registration should be denied. Securities Amendments Act, supra note 14,
§ 16, at 146-47 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a)(1) (1982)) (amending § 19 of the
1934 Act by adding new § 19(a)(1)). The Commission must grant registration if it finds that
the requirements of the 1934 Act and its rules with respect to the applicant are satisfied. See
Securities Amendments Act, supra note 14, § 16, at 146 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78s(a)(1)(B) (1982)) (amending § 19 of the 1934 Act by adding § 19(a)(l)(B)).
36. See supra note 20.
37. See supra note 22 for the Commission's authority to discipline SRO members for vio-
lations of SRO rules. The Commission also has the authority to discipline SRO members for
violations of the Commission's rules. See supra note 24. In addition, the Commission has
authority to discipline brokers for (i) willfully supplying the Commission with misinformation
with regard to broker registrations; (ii) being convicted of certain specified crimes reflecting
upon a broker's integrity; (iii) being judicially enjoined from acting in a specified capacity in
various financial industries; (iv) willfully violating the securities laws; (v) willfully aiding and.
abetting any person in securities law violations, or (vi) being subject to a Commission order
barring such broker from associating with another broker. See Securities Amendments Act,
supra note 14, § 11(2), at 122-23 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4) (1982)).
38. See supra note 25.
39. In one instance, the Commission's authority has been restricted so that it may only be
utilized in a reserve fashion. Even when so limited, however, there is a broad exception that
allows the Commission to act in other than a reserve manner. Thus, the Commission's author-
ity to bring an action enjoining persons from violating the rules of a self-regulatory organiza-
tion (as opposed to the Commission's own rules) is limited to instances in which "it appears to
the Commission" that (i) the SRO is unable or unwilling to take appropriate action against the
violator, or (ii) the Commission's action is "otherwise necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors." Securities Amendments Act, supra note 14, § 21(3),
at 155 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u(f) (1982)) (amending the 1934 Act by adding
§ 21(0) (emphasis added).
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exchange rule, the Commission had first to make an "appropriate request in
writing" to an exchange for that body to effect, on its own behalf, the desired
change in its rules or practices.4° Such qualifying restrictions are absent
from the present section 19(c) of the Act (which empowers the Commission
to alter the rules of the self-regulatory bodies). Similarly, the other grants to
the Commission of direct authority discussed above are largely unfettered by
requirements that the Commission make any attempt to seek action by the
self-regulatory bodies before acting on its own.
III. THE ABSENCE OF GUIDELINES FOR ALLOCATING REGULATORY
RESPONSIBILITY
The difficulties engendered by this dual regulatory system arise from Con-
gress' failure to formulate clear guidelines as to which entity should be re-
sponsible for initiating regulation in a given instance. Arguably, the
presumption that underlies the Securities Exchange Act, that day-to-day ad-
ministration of the trading markets is the responsibility of the self-regulatory
bodies,4 ' is actually a principle for allocating regulatory responsibility. In-
deed, under the scheme of the Act, SROs are responsible for all perfunctory
market regulatory activities, such as admitting members to the organiza-
tions,42 assuring them fair representation in selecting directors,43 allocating
dues equitably," implementing fair trading,45 and enforcing the organiza-
tion's rules.46 This presumption regarding day-to-day regulatory concerns,
40. See supra note 21.
41. An essential philosophy underlying the 1934 Act was that the exchanges would be
responsible for the administration of their respective market centers. John Dickinson, then
Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Stock
Exchange Regulation that laid the foundation of the 1934 Act, opined that it would be "sheer
ineffectiveness" to have the government handle the "practical problem of administration."
1934 House Hearings, supra note 7, at 514.
42. Securities Amendments Act, supra note 14, §§ 4, 12(2), at 104, 127 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b)(2), 78o-3(b)(3) (1982)) (amending the 1934 Act by adding
§§ 6(b)(2), 15A(b)(3)).
43. Securities Amendments Act, supra note 14, §§ 4, 12(2), at 105, 127 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b)(3), 78o-3(b)(4) (1982)) (amending the 1934 Act by adding
§§ 6(b)(3), 15A(b)(4)).
44. Securities Amendments Act, supra note 14, §§ 4, 12(2), at 105, 127 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b)(4), 78o-3(b)(5) (1982)) (amending the 1934 Act by adding
§§ 6(b)(3), 15A(b)(4)).
45. Securities Amendments Act, supra note 14, §§ 4, 12(2), at 105, 127-28 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b)(5), 78o-3(b)(6) (1982)) (amending the 1934 Act by adding
§§ 6(b)(5), 15A(b)(6)).
46. Securities Amendments Act, supra note 14, §§ 4, 12(2), at 104, 127 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b)(1), 78o-3(b)(2) (1982)) (amending the 1934 Act by adding new
§§ 6(b)(1), 15A(b)(2)).
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however, does not resolve the question of how to allocate regulatory respon-
sibility for other than the administration of perfunctory matters.
Although guidelines do not exist for allocating responsibility for major
regulatory concerns, the Commission does retain ultimate authority over
trading market regulation.47 Possession of ultimate control, however, while
resolving questions of which entity may dictate allocation of regulatory re-
sponsibility, does not resolve upon what criteria that allocation should be
made or in what instances an allocation needs to be made.
IV. THE NEED FOR PRINCIPLES FOR ALLOCATING REGULATORY
RESPONSIBILITY
The development of a dual regulatory system with overlapping authority
and no reasoned principles for allocating that authority, other than with re-
spect to purely administrative matters, creates a number of impediments to
the proper functioning of our securities markets. Some of these impediments
are tangible, existing problems that can be observed and reported. Others
are more difficult to observe but, nonetheless, remain as potential threats to
the future effectiveness of securities market regulation.
V. THE PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM REGULATORY OVERLAP
1. The absence of guidelines for the assumption of responsibility for ini-
tiating market regulatory policy development has meant that very similar
regulatory issues have received different treatment depending upon whether
the regulatory initiative was assumed by the Commission or by one of the
SROs. At times, the Commission will all but ignore certain regulatory con-
cerns, allowing the SROs to assume regulatory initiative. At other times, the
Commission has reversed its posture and has assumed the regulatory respon-
sibility and imposed its own perspective on the issue in question. This incon-
sistency in regulation makes regulatory policy unpredictable and may
discourage SROs from taking the initiative in developing market structure
improvements. An example in point is the regulatory treatment that has
been afforded the SROs in the development of their respective automatic
small order execution systems.
The automatic small order execution systems were one of the trading de-
47. In the Senate Report accompanying the bill that was to become the 1975 Reform Act,
it was emphasized that although the responsibilities of the Commission and the SROs fit into a
pattern of partnership and cooperation, the SROs and the Commission do not "enjoy the same
order of authority or deserve the same degree of deference, whether by firms, courts or the
Congress. The self-regulatory organizations exercise authority subject to SEC oversight."
1975 SENATE REPORT, supra note 25, at 23.
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vices developed by the SROs in the 1970's and early 1980's and were
designed to encourage order flow to the respective exchanges (or to the over-
the-counter market).48 Although there are a number of variations in the
operation of these systems, they basically provide brokerage firms with a
routing device to send orders, up to a specific number of shares,49 from the
firm's trading room directly to the appropriate trading post on the floor of
the exchange utilizing the execution systems. Regardless of the current quo-
tation on that exchange, the order is guaranteed by the specialist at the trad-
ing post at an execution price equal to the best (or "inside") consolidated
quotation. This quotation represents a composite of all of the quotations
currently available on a specific listed security on the major exchanges as
well as in the over-the-counter market.
These automated execution systems at first blush appear to be consistent
with the 1975 Reform Act provisions that call for the establishment of a
national market system." This legislation directs that the national market
system be capable of assuring "economically efficient execution of securities
transactions"'" and "the practicability of brokers executing investors' orders
in the best market."52 Indeed, the automatic small order execution systems
provide both efficient execution and the best execution price among the quo-
tations of a multiple number of markets. However, on closer examination,
these execution systems work at cross-purposes with major national market
systems goals.
The regional exchanges, 53 coveting increased order flow, do not provide
48. As of the end of 1984, there are three stock exchanges that have in operation an
automatic small order execution system. The Pacific Stock Exchange has SCOREX. The
Midwest Stock Exchange has MAX. The Philadelphia Stock Exchange has PACE. For a
discussion of these systems, see Order Instituting Proceedings to Determine Whether to Ap-
prove or Disapprove Proposed Rule Change (SR-NYSE-83-8), SEA Release No. 19,858 (June
9, 1983), 28 SEC DOCKET (CCH) 16, 17 (June 21, 1983) [hereinafter cited as R4 Extension
Proposal Release]. See also Lipton, Best Execution: The National Market System's Missing
Ingredient, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 449, 493-95 (1982). The National Association of Securi-
ties Dealers implemented a small order execution system of its own-SOES-at the end of
1984. SEC. WEEK, Sept. 24, 1984, at 6.
49. As an example, SCOREX today can execute orders of up to 1099 shares. SEC. WEEK,
Aug. 13, 1984, at 9.
50. The Securities Amendments Act, supra note 14, § 7, at 112 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(2) (1982)) (amending the 1934 Act by adding § 1lA(a)(2)), directed the
Securities and Exchange Commission to "facilitate the establishment of a national market sys-
tem." For a description of the national market system, see generally Lipton, supra note 48.
51. Securities Amendments Act, supra note 14, § 7, at 112 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(l)(C)(i) (1982)) (amending the 1934 Act by adding § I1A(a)(l)(C)(i)).
52. Securities Amendments Act, supra note 14, § 7, at 112 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(1)(C)(iv) (1982)) (amending the 1934 Act by adding § 1 A(a)(l)(C)(iv)).
53. The "regional exchanges" are all the major exchanges other than the NYSE and the
AMEX, both of which are considered primary exchanges. For the most part, the regionals
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through their small order execution systems a mechanism for routing orders
to the market offering the best available quotation. Rather, these execution
systems are designed to "match" the best available quotation and to execute
orders received on the recipient exchange at that best available quotation.
As a result, the market center that promulgated the best quote from which
the automated system derives its execution price is not rewarded with order
flow corresponding to its attractive bid or offer. Without that reward, the
incentive to promulgate attractive quotations is removed. Thus, a major na-
tional market system goal of encouraging better bids and offers by ensuring
order flow to market centers in response to attractive quotations 54 is
thwarted by automatic small order execution mechanisms with derivative
pricing mechanisms.
In addition, although automatic execution systems will match the best
available quotation, they do not necessarily guarantee customers executions
at the best available price. One of the three automatic execution systems in
place on regional exchanges-PACE on the Philadelphia Stock Exchange-
has historically not provided any mechanism to allow orders routed by the
automatic system to interact with trading on the floor of the exchange.55
Thus, although orders routed through PACE will be executed at the best
quotation available on a multiple number of market centers, if there were
trading interest on the floor of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange that would
otherwise better the consolidated quotation, the automatically transmitted
order would not benefit from this trading interest. For example, consider
the situation in which the best consolidated bid (that is, offer to buy) for a
security might be 40 V8. Assume a market sell order was transmitted
through the automatic execution system on the Philadelphia Stock Ex-
change. Even if there were a broker on the floor of the Philadelphia Stock
Exchange with a willingness to buy at 40 , the automatically transmitted
sell order would still be executed at 40 V8.
trade the same securities as those traded on the primary exchanges, and thus they compete to
attract order flow away from the primary markets.
54. An essential assumption underlying the national market system was that better prices
would be offered investors if market makers (securities dealers who disseminate quotations)
knew that they would get increased business (order flow) in response to the offer of better
prices (higher bids and lower offers). For a discussion of the assumption, see Lipton, supra
note 48, at 457-58 nn.36-40 and accompanying text.
55. Both SCOREX and MAX are programmed to allow trading interest on the floor of
the respective exchanges in which these trading devices exist to interact with the automatically
routed order just prior to execution. If either the specialist or the brokers on the exchange
floor want to execute against a market order at a price superior to the consolidated quotation,
such opportunity is provided during a 30-second interval just prior to automatic execution.
PACE does not provide this opportunity for interaction from trading interest on the floor of
the exchange. R4 Extension Proposal Release, supra note 48, at 18.
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Further, none of the automatic execution systems on the regional ex-
changes permit automatically transmitted orders to interact with superior
bids and offers in trading crowds on other exchanges. Thus, on none of the
regionals would automatically transmitted orders necessarily receive the best
available price for their execution. Rather, they typically would receive the
best of the consolidated quotations. In addition, with some execution sys-
tems, there would also be an opportunity for improvement in the consoli-
dated quotation from the trading crowd on only one regional exchange, not
the trading crowds on all exchanges.
The Commission has not been unaware of the challenges to the national
market principles presented by the automatic execution systems. As early as
June 1980, the Commission stated: "[O]rders sent to regional exchanges
. ..are often executed in those markets without any intermarket exposure
. ..[at times] because they are executed, on an automated basis, based on a
derivative pricing formula [the composite quotation]." 56 Although the
Commission was not unaware of the problems presented by the automatic
execution systems, it did not initiate any regulatory response to those
problems. Further, there was no statutory requirement demanding that the
Commission initiate a regulatory response. The Commission's responsibility
for the national market system, as with its responsibility for other regulatory
matters, is a joint one with the SROs. The Commission's mandate specifi-
cally is to "facilitate the establishment of a national market system for secur-
ities."57 This lack of direction in requiring Commission initiative with
regard to a critical national market system component leads to an inconsis-
tent application of regulatory principles. Such inconsistencies can work to
discourage self-regulatory initiative by the SROs.
By 1982, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) had come to realize that
it was not entirely competitive in the field of small order execution systems
and it began to perceive that it might be losing order flow as a conse-
quence.58 The NYSE had a small order routing system-the Designated
56. Off-Board Trading Restrictions, SEA Release No. 16,888 (June 11, 1980), 20 SEC
DOCKET (CCH) 334, 342 (June 24, 1980).
57. Securities Amendments Act, supra note 14, § 7, at 112 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(2) (1982)) (amending the 1934 Act by adding § 1 A(a)(2)).
58. See Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Proposed Rule
Change, SEA Release No. 19,047 (Sept. 14, 1982), 26 SEC DOCKET (CCH) 147, 148 (Sept. 29,
1982) ("the Commission recognizes the NYSE's need to provide competitive alternatives to the
automatic execution systems developed by certain regional exchanges"). The securities indus-
try media reported that "the reason behind the RRRR [the NYSE small order execution sys-
tem discussed infra at text following note 59] pilot is NYSE's desire to entice back small-order
flow which may have left the exchange because of regional exchanges small-order automatic
execution systems and prevent further order-flow erosion." SEC. WEEK, April 5, 1982, at 1.
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Order Turnaround, or DOT.5 9 This system routes small orders directly to a
specialist but does not guarantee an execution price. Instead, DOT relies
upon interaction with exchange floor trading to determine an execution
price. To compete with the automatic execution features of the regional ex-
changes' small order execution systems, the NYSE developed the Registered
Representative Rapid Response Service or R4.
The R4 was not intended as a routing system as much as it was a mecha-
nism for guaranteeing a customer a specified execution price (at the best
consolidated quotation) at the moment the order was placed. Through R4, a
customer would be told by his registered representative (broker) that the
customer has received an immediate execution based upon the best consoli-
dated quotation at that moment. After guaranteeing the customer the trans-
action at the specified price, the registered representative would send a
report of the transaction to the exchange floor where the specialist would
insure that the transaction was executed at the specified price even if it re-
quired that the specialist accept the execution for his own account. 60 As
with all of the automatic execution systems, R4 would "internalize" (that is,
execute on the floor of the recipient exchange without opportunity for inter-
action with orders on other market centers) the order flow coming through
the system and would price match rather than send the order to an exchange
with a superior quotation. And as with the PACE execution system, R4
would not provide interaction with the trading crowd on the floor of the
NYSE nor with trading crowds on other exchanges.
These limitations of R4 were inconsistent with the national market system
goals of encouraging price competition and achieving best executions. How-
ever, they were identical to the limitations of the automatic execution sys-
tems already in operation on the regional exchanges in regard to which the
Commission had not initiated corrective action. The message that the Com-
mission had sent the NYSE through its failure to object to the regional ex-
changes' automatic execution systems might well have been read as saying
that such systems were acceptable. As a practical matter, it is likely that the
Commission had just not assumed responsibility for initiating a solution to a
regulatory problem that could have been resolved by the SROs themselves or
by the Commission.
When the NYSE sought to adopt the R4 system, initially on an experi-
mental basis,6 ' the Commission decided that the regulatory problems
59. For a description of DOT, see R4 Extension Proposal Release, supra note 48, at 18.
60. For a description of the R4 system, see Notice of Filing Order Granting Accelerated
Approval of Proposed Rule Change, SEA Release No. 19,047 (Sept. 14, 1982), 26 SEC
DOCKET (CCH) 147 (Sept. 29, 1982).
61. Id.
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presented by the automatic execution systems were a regulatory concern that
it would address. In response to a rule change request by the NYSE for
temporary implementation of the R4 system, the Commission raised con-
cerns about the failure of the R4 system to achieve best execution because of
the lack of interaction between the orders sent and the trading crowd on the
floor of the exchange.
62
Because the R4 system at that point was going to be implemented only in
a pilot stage, the Commission chose to approve the proposed rule.6' How-
ever, the signal had been sent that (i) the Commission was indeed choosing
to focus on this regulatory problem, and (ii) the Commission might come out
against R4 when permanent approval was sought. It is of interest to note
that, in this instance, although the Commission was working in a purely
oversight mode, that is, review of rule proposals, it was using its oversight
position to initiate a solution to a regulatory concern.
A year later, when the NYSE sought to expand and extend its R4 pro-
gram through a new rule filing," the Commission expounded further upon
its concerns with automatic execution systems. It raised the possibility that
the rule proposals might be disapproved as being inconsistent with the goals
of the national market system. Again, the Commission noted that R4 does
not necessarily provide best execution. 65 In addition, the Commission ex-
pressed its concern with the impact of the R4 price matching mechanism on
price competition among market centers.66 Both of these drawbacks to R4
existed with the other automatic execution systems already approved by the
Commission. Admittedly, the magnitude of trading volume on the NYSE
and the primacy of that market as a price setting center as compared to the
regional markets would give the Commission greater discomfort with limita-
tions when found in R4 as opposed to other automatic execution systems.67
However, it undoubtedly had always been apparent that a grant of approval
by the Commission for small execution systems on regional exchanges would
inevitably lead to a request for such a system by the NYSE. To permit the
regional exchanges to operate automatic execution systems and not to permit
the same privilege to the NYSE would be perceived as an inconsistent appli-
cation of regulatory principles.68
62. Id. at 148.
63. Id. at 149.
64. See R4 Extension Proposal Release, supra note 48.
65. Id. at 19.
66. Id. at 20.
67. The Commission questioned whether the diversion of such a magnitude of order flow
to a derivative pricing mechanism (based upon the consolidated quotation) would skew the
market pricing mechanism. Id. at 20.
68. In a letter to the SEC, reported upon in the securities industry media, the NYSE
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Although the Commission ultimately permitted the NYSE to continue the
R4 experiment for another year,6 9 it did so only tentatively and with threats
of a future quid pro quo that the NYSE would unlikely want to pay. The
Commission indicated that it would closely monitor R4 operations, and it
required that brokers using R4 inform their customers that they might be
missing better executions. In addition, the Commission indicated that if it
ultimately approved R4, it might, to be consistent, also require the NYSE to
abandon its restrictions on trading by its members in the over-the-counter
market, restrictions that artificially augment the NYSE's volume and reve-
nues. The NYSE, however, has not proceeded to seek a permanent approval
for the R4 system.
Arguably, the Commission's attention to the limitations of the R4 system
was warranted. However, if attention is warranted when customers fail to
get the best available price through an automatic execution mechanism on
the NYSE, surely attention is warranted to identical limitations of execution
systems on the regional exchanges. The problem with R4 is clearly of a
greater dimension than with automatic execution systems on the regional
exchanges because of the magnitude of trading on the NYSE. It would seem
to be an untenable position, however, for the Commission to hold that fail-
ure to achieve best execution is not a regulatory problem when arrived at
through trading on regional exchanges but that it is a problem when arrived
at through trading on the NYSE. It is more likely that the Commission
chose not to assume regulatory responsibility for the trading problem when
it first appeared on the regional exchanges but did choose to assume regula-
tory responsibility for the trading problem when it later appeared on the
NYSE.
The statutory directives for the Commission in initiating regulatory re-
sponses do not demand greater consistency. The mutuality of regulation in
the existing oversight system permits both the Commission and the SROs to
respond to perceived problems of the nature created by automatic execution
systems. One can speculate about the impact of such inconsistent regulation
on the willingness of an SRO to develop other innovative execution systems.
The speculation clearly might be that an SRO would, in the future, be less
willing to develop such innovative systems. Regardless of the certainty of
indeed raised the issue of inconsistent application of regulatory principles. The NYSE was
reported as writing: "Frankly we do not see how the Commission could justify using its au-
thority to sanction the array of execution systems operated by our competitors, while simulta-
neously discriminating against the NYSE's efforts to develop an innovative, competitive ...
[automatic execution system]." SEC. WEEK, Aug. 22, 1983, at 4.
69. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change, SEA Release No. 20,350 (Nov. 4, 1983), 29
SEC DOCKET (CCH) 97 (Nov. 22, 1983).
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such speculation, the regulatory scheme lacks an element of predictability
and a defined sense of order as a result of the absence of clear guidelines as to
when responsibility should be assumed.
2. The absence of authority-allocating guidelines based upon principles
of effective market regulation has also led to situations in which regulatory
responsibility has been assumed by or assigned to inappropriate regulatory
bodies. A good example was the allocation to the securities industry of the
responsibility for developing an "order exposure" rule and also for linking
the intermarket trading systems. The exposure rule had been proposed7" as
a means of preventing large retail brokerage houses from executing customer
orders, in certain exchange-listed securities, internally or "in-house,"'" with-
out first affording other brokers an opportunity to interact with these orders.
This in-house execution of customers' orders without market exposure is re-
ferred to as "internalization. '7 2 The order-exposure rule proposal 73 would
70. The Commission in 1980 first began publicly to discuss a possible need for an order
exposure rule. See Off-Board Trading Restrictions, SEA Release No. 16,888'(June 11, 1980),
20 SEC DOCKET (CCH) 334, 343 (June 24, 1980). In SEC Release No. 16,888, the Commis-
sion adopted rule 19c-3, which removed off-board trading restrictions for exchange members
trading as principal in certain securities listed after April 26, 1979. Off-board trading restric-
tions prevent exchange members from trading securities listed on their exchange on the over-
the-counter market.
71. With the elimination of off-board trading restrictions in regard to securities listed after
April 26, 1979, see supra note 70, it now was possible for firms to effect transactions for their
customers against the firm's own inventory in specified securities without ever exposing those
customers' orders to the give and take of a trading floor.
72. The Commission has stated that the term
'internalization,' when used with respect to the activities of an integrated broker-
dealer making markets over-the-counter, refers to the withholding of retail orders
from other market centers for the purpose of executing them 'in-house,' as principal,
without exposing those orders to buying and selling interest in those other market
centers.
Off-Board Trading Restrictions, SEA Release No. 15,769 (Apr. 26, 1979), 44 Fed. Reg.
26,688, 26,690 n.20 (1979).
The concern with internalization is that the customer will not receive best execution because
the execution received in-house will be inferior to what could be received if exposed to all buy
and sell orders in external market centers.
73. The Commission eventually proposed alternative possible order exposure rules. See
Order Exposure Rules, SEA Release No. 18,738 (May 13, 1982), 25 SEC DOCKET (CCH) 358
(May 26, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Order Exposure Proposal Release]. The specific proposals
presented by the Commission were developed by the NYSE and the Securities Industry Asso-
ciation. Although the proposals differed, their central characteristics were similar and are
described in the text above. After extensive public comment, the Commission refined its pro-
posal and again sought public comment. See Reproposal of an Order Exposure Rule, SEA
Release No. 19,372 (Dec. 23, 1982), 26 SEC DOCKET (CCH) 1549 (Jan. 11, 1983). Ultimately,
the Commission decided to defer action on its proposed order exposure rule. See Request for
Comment on Off-Board Trading Pursuant to Rule 19c-3, SEA Release No. 20,074 (Aug. 12,
1983), 15 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1669 (Aug. 19, 1983).
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have required that, before a broker internalizes a customer's order, the order
essentially be advertised in an electronic intermarket trading system that
would allow the customer the benefit of having his order interact with other
buying and selling interests. Only if no other interest developed within a
specified period of time would an internalized execution be permitted.
The primary exchanges stood to suffer a decline in trading volume and a
deterioration in the quality of their market if sufficient numbers of transac-
tions were "internalized" in brokerage houses and not transacted on the
floor of an exchange. Predictably, these exchanges were in favor of some
kind of order exposure rule. 4 The NASD, which represents the interests of
the brokerage houses that would have reaped the benefits of the "off-board"
trading, did not agree that there was a need for the rule and found the spe-
cific rule proposals that had been made to be unfair and unworkable.7 5
Closely related to the internalization issue had been the question of when
and how to link together the electronic intermarket trading system (ITS),7 6
which serves the exchanges, and a newly developed trading system
(CAES),77 which facilitates trading over the counter. The exchanges be-
lieved that linking these two systems would exacerbate the internalization
problem because the linkage would provide additional order flow to those
brokers who would execute customer orders in-house. 78 Consequently, the
exchanges were opposed to linking the two systems prior to the Commis-
74. See infra note 79.
75. Letter of July 23, 1982 from Gordon S. Macklin, President of the NASD, to George
A. Fitzsimmons, Secretary of SEC, commenting on the Commission's proposed order exposure
rules. SEC File No. S7-930, at 1.
76. The intermarket trading system is an electronic routing system that links the seven
major national securities exchanges and permits executions to be made in any of the linked
market centers by a broker physically present in another market center. Through ITS, a bro-
ker, standing at the post for security ABC on exchange 1, can examine the quotations for
security ABC on exchanges 2, 3, and 4. If he finds a more attractive quotation on another
exchange, he can effect his execution in ABC stock on that exchange without leaving the trad-
ing post on exchange 1.
77. The NASD has also developed an order routing and execution mechanism that links
certain over-the-counter market makers trading in specified securities. The NASD's trading
system is referred to as the Computer Assisted Execution System or CAES. For a description
of CAES, see Lipton, supra note 48, at 496-98.
The linkage of ITS and CAES enables traders on exchanges to execute at better prices not
merely on other exchanges but in the over-the-counter market as well. The linkage provides
similar opportunities for over-the-counter traders.
78. When the Commission ordered the NASD and the ITS participants to effect a linkage,
it acknowledged that "several commentators have argued strenuously that implementation of
the Automated Interface . . . will increase the degree of internalization." Notice and Order
Requiring Implementation of an Automated Interface, SEA Release No. 17,744 (Apr. 21,
1981), 600 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) G1, G6 (Apr. 22, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Linkage
Order].
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sion's resolution of the internalization problem.7 9 The NASD, seeing no
need for an order exposure rule in the first place, did not believe linkage
needed to be delayed.80
As a matter of regulatory authority, both the SEC and the collective SROs
had the authority to initiate rulemaking efforts to address the concerns cre-
ated by internalization and to accomplish the linkage of ITS and CAES.
The SROs, however, were subject to powerful conflicting self-interests that
one might have predicted would prevent them from cooperating with one
another in any attempt to resolve the internalization and linkage issues.
Only the SEC would be free from conflicts with self-interests in responding
to these matters.
Unfortunately, the Commission did not initially assume responsibility for
linkage and internalization. Instead, in April 1981, it ordered the exchanges
and the NASD to work out a scheme for linkage and, at the same time,
expressed its support for "industry efforts to address internalization con-
cerns."8" No meaningful public discussion as to why responsibility for these
matters was assigned to the self-regulators was provided by the Commission.
Disagreements among the self-regulators concerning internalization and
linkage were well advertised before the Commission ordered the linkage, and
the disagreements continued to plague the industry after the Commission's
order.8 2 The Commission was twice compelled to delay the implementation
of the linkage because the industry was unable to resolve its differences on
how the linkage should be effected.83 In March 1982, the Commission re-
79. "[T]he one fundamental rule which must be required to precede commencement of
any test linkage. . . is a rule which appropriately addresses internalization." Letter from J.E.
Buck, Secretary of the NYSE, to George A. Fitzsimmons, Secretary of the SEC (Mar. 13,
1981), SEC File No. 4-208 at 4-5. The Commission was aware of, and had previously noted,
the NYSE's expectation that linkage would not occur prior to the implementation of a "pre-
liminary" rule addressing internalization concerns. Intermarket Trading System, SEA Release
No. 17,516 (Feb. 5, 1981), 46 Fed. Reg. 12,379, 12,382 (1981) (release proposing the linkage
order).
80. Linkage Order, supra note 78, at G4. The NASD supported the Commission's propo-
sal to require linkage of the ITS and the NASD execution systems and did not request an order
exposure rule prior to linkage.
81. Id. at G8.
82. Nearly a year after the Linkage Order, a commercial securities industry newsletter
reported that: "[A]lmost no progress on substantive issues dividing the parties [the exchanges
and the over-the-counter traders] has been made since the Commission ordered the link last
April [1981]." I-T-S Link Delayed with New Internalization Rule in the Works, SEC. WEEK,
Mar. 7, 1981, at 2.
83. In the Linkage Order, supra note 78, the Commission set March 1, 1982 as the imple-
mentation date of the linkage. This date was already five months later than the September 30,
1981 date that the Commission had set when it formally proposed the linkage in its February
1981 release. Intermarket Trading System, SEA Release No. 17,516 (Feb. 5, 1981), 46 Fed.
Reg. 12,379 (1981). The Commission then delayed the implementation date until May 1,
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versed itself and finally assumed responsibility for adopting rules to allow
ITS and CAES to be linked.8 4 Three months later it assumed responsibility
for proposing alternatives for an order exposure rule.85
In essence, when the Commission ordered the industry to effect an ITS-
CAES linkage, it allocated regulatory responsibility for this matter to the
self-regulators. The allocation rationale, however, was not explicit, and
Commission attention did not appear to be focused upon the desirability of
the specific allocation. A reasonable conclusion could be drawn that author-
ity was allocated to entities that were predictably unable to cooperate in
devising regulatory solutions because of irreconcilable conflicts. This misal-
location of responsibility led to delays in the implementation of the linkage
of the two intermarket trading systems. Ultimately, the Commission reallo-
cated responsibility and assumed the leadership role for implementing
linkage and resolving the order exposure rule question. Arguably, explicit
guidelines for allocating authority based upon principles of effective market
regulation would have dictated the Commission's assumption of responsibil-
ity in the first instance.
3. In other situations, the lack of an explicit allocation system based on
principles of effective regulation has led to the assumption of regulatory re-
sponsibility by a regulatory entity that proved ultimately ineffective for rea-
sons other than conflicts of interest. The 1934 Act, as amended, does not
require that general rulemaking, whether affecting market structure or some
other technical area of market regulation, be initiated only by that entity
with the greatest expertise for the undertaking. Although the Commission
seeks and obtains public comment on its rule proposals,86 the issues upon
which the Commission focuses are formulated by a market regulation staff
that, prior to employment at the Commission, typically has either limited or
1982. Intermarket Trading System, SEA Release No. 18,536 (Mar. 4, 1982), 24 SEC DOCKET
(CCH) 1079 (Mar. 17, 1982).
Just prior to the rescheduled implementation date, the press reported: "[C]ontinued indus-
try squabbles likely will force another delay in the planned electronic trading link between
stock exchanges and the over-the-counter market." Wall St. J., Apr. 29, 1942, at 25, col. 1.
On May 6, 1982, the Commission put off the date of implementation one last time. Order
Deferring Implementation of an Automated Interface, SEA Release No. 18,712 (May 6, 1982),
25 SEC DOCKET (CCH) 242 (May 18, 1982).
84. Intermarket Trading System, SEA Release No. 18,536 (Mar. 4, 1982), 24 SEC
DOCKET (CCH) 1079 (Mar. 17, 1982).
85. In May 1982, the Commission sought public comment on two alternative order expo-
sure proposals. See Order Exposure Proposal Release, supra note 73.
86. An example of a particularly effective effort by the Commission to elicit comment on
its rule proposals was the proposal of the order exposure rule. The Commission received more
than 450 comment letters in response to its proposed order exposure rules. Reproposal of an
Order Exposure Rule, SEA Release No. 19,372 (Dec. 23, 1982), 26 SEC DOCKET (CCH) 1549
(Jan. 11, 1983).
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no experience in the securities industry. 7 This same staff analyzes the infor-
mation gathered during the comment period and suggests solutions to the
Commission. This lack of "hands-on" industry experience places the Com-
mission staff at a relative disadvantage to industry personnel in addressing
certain technical market regulatory issues.
In some instances, it has appeared that the Commission staff has not had
the familiarity with market operations to appreciate fully the impact of its
market structuring activities. As an example, in 1978, the Commission, at
the urging of its staff, adopted a "firm quote" rule (rule l lAcl-1).8 8 The
object of the rule was to provide quotation information for certain frequently
traded securities. This was to be achieved in part by requiring that all bro-
ker-dealers who make bids or offers in these securities report "promptly"
these quotations to their exchange or to the NASD. The firm quote rule was
to be a central element of the national market system since it would promote
intermarket competition by providing accurate and current information as
to the price at which securities could be bought and sold on various
exchanges.89
Less than three years after implementation of the firm quote rule, the
Commission essentially reversed itself and nullified the impact of the rule by
removing the mandatory reporting requirement for most categories of bro-
ker-dealers. 90 What the Commission staff discovered during those three
years was that many broker-dealers, who were not active traders in the sub-
87. Typically few or none of the higher ranking staff members of the Division of Market
Regulation have had employment experience within the securities industry prior to their ser-
vice with the Commission.
88. Dissemination of Quotations for Reported Securities, SEA Release No. 14,415 (Jan.
26, 1978), 43 Fed. Reg. 4342 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Quote Rule Release].
89. In 1973, the Commission described the quotation reporting element of the national
market system as being "[a]t the heart of the [national] market system." SEC, STRUCTURE OF
A CENTRAL MARKET SYSTEM (1973), reprinted in Hearings on HR. 5050 & 340 Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce & Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
H.R. REP. No. 52, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 912 (1974). It was believed that the quotation system
would allow brokers to route orders to markets providing attractive quotations. This price
responsive order flow would encourage price competition among market makers, each of
whom would attempt to put out competitively attractive quotations in order to attract order
flow. Quote Rule Release, supra note 88, at 4346.
90. See SEA Release No. 18,482 (Feb. 11, 1982), 24 SEC DOCKET (CCH) 876 (Feb. 23,
1982) [hereinafter cited as Quotation Modification Release]. Instead of requiring all brokers
and dealers who communicate quotations on exchange floors or over the counter to report
such quotations into the quotation system, and instead of requiring the exchange or securities
association to collect such information, the Commission now requires that brokers and dealers
report, and exchanges and securities associations collect, the information only in regard to
"subject securit[ies]." Rule llAcl-l(c)(1), (b)(1), 17 C.F.R. §§240.IlAcl-l(c)(l),
240.1lAcl-l(b)(1) (1984). The term "subject security" in turn was defined to exclude any
security for which the market center upon which the security was traded was not the primary
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ject securities, used machines to both compute and communicate what essen-
tially amounted to artificial quotations. The machine-generated quotations
were always at prices that were somewhat worse than ("away from") the
quotations reported by the active markets. 9' Such quotations allowed non-
active broker-dealers to comply with the firm quote rule but were not in-
tended to attract customers. They consequently made the quote rule
relatively meaningless.
The Commission's staff did not appear to be sufficiently familiar with the
intricacies of the securities industry either to foresee the problem with the
quote rule or to structure the quote rule so as to avoid the problem of mean-
ingless quotations. In this instance, it is possible that the Commission staff
lacked the expertise to assume regulatory responsibility for the quote rule.
But again, no explicit allocation system existed that would have dictated that
the Commission allocate responsibility for the quote rule to the entity with
the greatest relevant expertise. Allocating responsibility to the self-regula-
tors could have been accomplished without the sacrifice of desirable Com-
mission goals encompassed in the firm quote rule. The Commission has the
authority pursuant to section 11 A(a)(3)(B)9 2 of the Act to direct the self-
regulators to develop a rule that complies with those national market system
objectives that the Commission seeks to accomplish. The use of this "indi-
rect" authority would have allowed the Commission to utilize the expertise
of the self-regulators in devising a rule while still guaranteeing the Commis-
sion's ability to maintain control over the direction of the rule.
4. The absence of allocating principles also creates a number of intangi-
ble problems, the manifestations of which cannot be readily demonstrated
through case study, but which, nonetheless, raise regulatory concerns. Spe-
cifically, a dual regulatory sytem with pervasive overlapping authority that
can be exercised either by the Commission or by the self-regulatory bodies
diminishes the sense of responsibility experienced by the self-regulators. It
also injects an element of uncertainty into the governance of our trading
market center (with exception for securities affected by rule 19c-3). Rule 1 1AcI-I(a)(21), 17
C.F.R. § 240.11Acl-l(a)(21) (1984).
91. See Dissemination of Quotations for Reported Securities, SEA Release No. 18,482
(Feb. 11, 1982), FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,098, at 84,852 (adopting changes to the quote
rule). See also Dissemination of Quotations for Reported Securities, SEA Release No. 17,583
(Feb. 27, 1981), 22 SEC DOCKET (CCH) 269 (Mar. 17, 1981) (proposing the changes
adopted). The Commission cited two other problems with the quote rule: (i) the lack of relia-
bility of the quotations; (ii) the difficulty in processing the voluminous quotation information.
Both of these additional problems can be significantly attributed to the use of machine-gener-
ated quotations.
92. Securities Amendments Act, supra note 14, § 7, at 112 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(3)(B) (1982)) (amending the 1934 Act by adding § 11A(a)(3)(B)).
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markets. The present regulatory system contains no guidelines that allow
self-regulators to know which regulatory problems they are expected to fo-
cus upon and which will fall within the province of the Commission.
Long-term marshalling of resources is made difficult by the knowledge
that many regulatory problems to which the self-regulators might choose to
devote resources are matters that the Commission also might choose to regu-
late. The self-regulatory bodies might hesitate to expend the resources nec-
essary to develop an effective all market trading surveillance system knowing
that the Commission might at some point either direct the creation of a sur-
veillance system with specified capabilities or develop such a system on its
own. (In the early 1980's, the Commission developed an intermarket over-
sight system-the Market Oversight and Surveillance System (MOSS)-
which reduced the Commission's dependence upon the surveillance systems
of the SROs).9 3 A self-regulatory body might be reluctant to engage in the
resource-consuming efforts involved in revising rules governing brokers' du-
ties to customers, such as the "know your customer" rule (which directs
brokers to investigate the financial welfare of their customers),94 if it believes
that the Commission might ultimately compel the adoption of a replacement
rule of its own devise. The New York Stock Exchange indeed did spend
some time in the late 1970's and early 1980's working on revisions to the
NYSE's "know your customer" rule. During this time, the Commission re-
versed its position toward this rule.95
93. See generally How the SEC Watches Stocks, N.Y. Times, April 13, 1984, at D-1; Re-
versing Policy, SEC Says It Will Continue Market Surveillance System, 15 SEC. REG. & L. REP.
(BNA) 1873 (Oct. 7, 1983).
94. See NYSE Rule 405, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide 2405 (CCH) (1980). The NASD's "know
your customer" rule is found in art. III, § 2 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice. CCH NASD
Manual 2152 (1981). For a discussion of "know your customer" rules, see generally N.
WOLFSON, R. PHILLIP, & T. Russo, REGULATION OF BROKERS, DEALERS AND SECURITIES
MARKETS 2.08(1) (1977); Cohen, The Suitability Doctrine: Defining Stockbrokers' Profes-
sional Responsibilities, 3 J. CORP. L. 533 (1978); Mundheim, Professional Responsibilities of
Broker-Dealers: The Suitability Doctrine, 1965 DUKE L.J. 445.
95. In 1977, the Commission instituted disapproval proceedings when the NYSE pro-
posed a revision to its rule 405, which revision would have eliminated any "know your cus-
tomer" duties for "carrying" firms with respect to an account introduced on a fully disclosed
basis. See Order Instituting Proceedings to Determine Whether Proposed Changes to Rule
405 Should be Disapproved, SEA Release No. 14,143 (Nov. 7, 1977), 13 SEC DOCKET (CCH)
639 (Nov. 22, 1977). A carrying broker can provide execution, clearing and bookkeeping serv-
ices for generally smaller firms which are referred to as introducing firms, and which accept
the actual orders from customers. The Commission initiated the disapproval proceedings in
part because it was concerned that under the proposed rule the carrying firm would bear no
responsibility to know the customers for which it performs clearing duties.
A perhaps less concerned Commission in 1981 was willing to approve rule changes by the
NYSE that had virtually the identical impact. The approved changes permit the carrying and
introducing parties to allocate responsibilities among themselves. See Notice of Filing of Pro-
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Self-regulatory organizations are discouraged from exercising diligence in
responding to certain regulatory problems for which responsibility is not
clearly mandated because the self-regulators know that if the problem is left
unresolved long enough, the Commission will ultimately have to initiate reg-
ulatory action to deal with it. This lack of diligence by self-regulators might
be particularly encouraged when the problem at issue is especially difficult or
when the appropriate resolution to a specific problem will be costly or un-
popular or both.
Finally, without guidelines for allocating responsibility, the regulatory
system loses its inherent order. The integrity of the system becomes suspect
when the exercise of authority appears quixotic. Market regulatory proce-
dures are developed by one regulatory body as opposed to another without
any apparent reason. Overall confidence in the regulatory system must suf-
fer as a consequence.
VI. CONCLUSION
The above described regulatory conflicts arising out of the dual nature of
the governing and oversight mechanism of our securities markets obviously
impact upon the effectiveness of the system. They came into existence pri-
marily as a result of the 1975 Securities Reform Act, which expanded the
Commission's authority to initiate direct regulatory action. This augmenta-
tion of authority was not accompanied by a corresponding establishment of
an explicit mechanism for determining to whom regulatory responsibility
should be allocated.
For a regulatory scheme based upon joint authority to continue to be a
completely successful method for governing our securities markets, attention
must be focused on the above difficulties and mechanisms must be explored
for satisfactorily allocating regulatory responsibility.9 6 The problems that
exist in the absence of explicit guidelines for allocation are varied. Some
relate to the lack of predictability in the present system. Others relate to the
fact that, in the absence of reasoned guidelines, allocations have been made
to regulators that were inherently inefficient in responding to particular mat-
posed Rule Change by New York Stock Exchange, Inc., SEA Release No. 18,229 (Nov. 2,
1981), 46 Fed. Reg. 55,467 (1981). Because carrying brokers have the vast balance of bargain-
ing power, agreements between the carrying and introducing brokers virtually always allocate
responsibility solely to the introducing broker.
96. In a previous article, this author explored a number of proposals for allocating regula-
tory responsibility. Lipton, The SEC or the Exchanges: Who Should Do What And When? A
Proposal to Allocate Regulatory Responsibilities for Securities Markets, 16 U.C. DAvis L. REV.
527 (1983). The proposals presented therein as well as the discussions in this article were and
are intended as bases for further discussions.
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ters. Whatever allocatory guidelines are ultimately chosen, consideration
must be given to the ability of these guidelines to provide predictability and
to assure efficient regulation.

